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Previous research has found that construal level—how abstractly or concretely people
represent events—can impact implicit evaluations. Abstract high-level construal (vs.
concrete low-level construal) promotes evaluative responses consistent with global
(strongly held, long-term) rather than local (short-term, situational) goals. It remains
unclear by what cognitive process(es) this occurs. In this paper, we examine two
possibilities. High-level construal might enhance the unintended influence of activated
evaluative associations or facilitate the detection and implementation of intentional
responses. To examine these possibilities, the current study applies a multinomial
processing tree model to data from Fujita and Han (2009). Results suggest that
high-level construal facilitates goal-consistent evaluations by increasing both the un-
intentional influence of activated goal-consistent positive associations and the inten-
tional detection of and implementation of accurate responding to goal-relevant stimuli.
These findings extend our understanding of how construal level promotes goal consis-
tent evaluations.
Keywords: self-control, implicit associations, construal level, goal pursuit
Researchers have long been interested in self-
control—decision-making that favors the pur-
suit of long-term global goals over short-term
local temptations (Ainslie, 1975; Fujita, 2011;
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). Many re-
searchers have suggested that self-control en-
tails the effortful inhibition of impulses, and as
such, requires access to sufficient cognitive re-
sources (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003;
Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Inzlicht &
Gutsell, 2007; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000;
Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Strack & Deutsch,
2004). However, there has been accumulating
evidence that individuals can pursue global
goals in the presence of local situational de-
mands even when cognitive resources are re-
stricted. That is, given sufficient motivation,
people can develop efficient responses to stim-
uli that advance rather than undermine global
motivations. For example, individuals with
chronically active egalitarian goals are capable
of making nonprejudiced evaluative responses
to stimuli that refer to stigmatized minorities,
even on implicit measures—tasks that restrict
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the influence of deliberate, resource-dependent
processes (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, & Vance, 2002; Gonsalkorale, Sherman,
Allen, Klauer, & Amodio, 2011; Moskowitz,
2002; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal,
1999). Similar effects on implicit evaluations
have been shown with other goals, such as
weight loss (Fishbach & Shah, 2006; Fishbach,
Zhang, & Trope, 2010). It seems that if individ-
uals have strongly held goals, they may evaluate
stimuli in a way that is consistent with such
goals, even when their resources are restricted.
In turn, goal-congruent implicit evaluations of
goal-relevant stimuli facilitate goal-congruent
behavior (Fujita, 2008; Fujita & Carnevale,
2012).
Construal Level and Self-Control
Research indicates that an important factor
in determining people’s implicit evaluations
of tempting stimuli is construal level. Individ-
uals can represent events at varying levels of
abstractness, focusing either on incidental,
context-specific features (i.e., low-level con-
strual) or more essential, generalized features
(i.e., high-level construal). Construal level
theory proposes that high- and low-level con-
strual represent a functional response to the
challenge of representing events that are psy-
chologically distant versus near, respectively
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). Psychological
distance refers to the removal of an event
from direct experience. For example, an event
that will occur a year from now or in another
country is psychologically distant relative to
an event that will occur tomorrow or in a town
where one lives. People lack reliable informa-
tion about concrete specifics about psycho-
logically distant events. In response to this
problem, construal level theory suggests that
they represent these events by engaging in
high-level construal—representing events in
terms of their core and essential features; a
process referred to as high-level construal.
This is functional because an event’s essential
features tend to be stable and invariant across all
possible manifestations. As concrete specifics be-
come more available and reliable with increasing
psychological proximity, people use this informa-
tion to create detailed and idiosyncratic represen-
tations of events; a process referred to as low-level
construal. This allows people to tailor their
thoughts, feelings, and behavior to the unique
demands of the specific event. Thus, a hiking trip
in the distant future might be represented as “com-
muning with nature,” and the same trip in the near
future might instead be represented as “walking
up this big hill with this heavy backpack in this
wet weather.”
Extensive research supports the notion that
people represent events that are psychologi-
cally distant versus near via high-level versus
low-level construal, respectively (for a re-
view, see Trope & Liberman, 2010). Impor-
tantly, research suggests that the opposite
may be true as well—that is, engaging in
high-level versus low-level construal may at-
tune people to concerns that extend beyond
immediate direct experience. For example,
manipulating construal level directly leads
people to be more concerned about their more
abstract goals and values rather than more
immediate pragmatic concerns (e.g., Torelli
& Kaikati, 2009). In the context of self-
control, inducing high-level versus low-level
construal promotes preferences for outcomes
consistent with long-term goals rather than
short-term temptations (e.g., Fujita, 2008; Fu-
jita & Carnevale, 2012). When those con-
cerned about weight-loss, for example, are
engaged in high-level rather than low-level
construal, they are more likely to evaluate
food temptations relatively negatively and re-
port diet-consistent food preferences (Fujita
& Han, 2009).
Of note, these changes in evaluation as a
function of construal level are evident even
when they are assessed using implicit measures,
such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). In one
study, for example, participants belonging to a
population concerned about weight-loss goals
who engaged in high-level construal evaluated
apples more positively than candy bars relative
to those engaged in low-level construal (Fujita
& Han, 2009). These differences in how partic-
ipants performed on the IAT, moreover, medi-
ated the effect of construal level on a subse-
quent preference for an apple versus a candy
bar. Thus, construal level appears to impact
self-control via changes in how people evaluate
goal relevant-stimuli, and these changes in eval-
uation do not appear to require conscious delib-
eration.
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Processes Involved in Implicit Evaluations
Although the findings of Fujita and Han
(2009) demonstrate that construal level can in-
fluence implicit evaluations, there is still little
known about the processes that underlie this
effect. For example, one might posit that high-
level (vs. low-level) construal reduces the influ-
ence of positive evaluative associations for
temptations or increase the influence of positive
associations for goal consistent stimuli. Alterna-
tively, high-level (vs. low-level) construal may
enhance relatively positive evaluations of goal-
relevant stimuli by facilitating the ability to accu-
rately identify and respond to such stimuli.
Initially, measures such as the IAT were de-
signed to capture automatically activated eval-
uative associations. However, recent research
has indicated that a number of other processes
also contribute to IAT performance (e.g., Amo-
dio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Amodio et
al., 2004; Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski,
Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Gonsalkorale et
al., 2011; Sherman et al., 2008; Stewart &
Payne, 2008). One can use process dissociation
(PD; Payne, 2008) to tease apart the contribu-
tions of these processes. Based on patterns of
responding, the PD model independently esti-
mates two parameters: C and A. The C param-
eter represents the ability to intentionally iden-
tify and respond accurately to goal-relevant
stimuli (e.g., correctly categorizing an apple as
good, on an apple  good trial). In contrast, the
A parameter represents responses driven by
cognitive and evaluative associations without
intention (i.e., producing an impulse to catego-
rize an apple as good). According to the PD
model, the processes captured by the A param-
eter are always active, but only drive responses
in the absence of C (Payne, 2001). Thus, if the
correct response is determined, it will be en-
acted. In this way, one can conceptualize the C
parameter as the process that correctly identifies
and responds to goal-relevant stimuli, and the A
parameter as capturing a process that biases
responses in either an accuracy-congruent or
incongruent manner (depending on whether the
trial is pairing compatible or incompatible con-
cepts) when C fails.
Process dissociation has been widely imple-
mented in research that is interested in indepen-
dently measuring competing processes. For ex-
ample, PD procedures have been applied to the
domains of stereotyping (Amodio et al., 2004,
2008), moral psychology (Conway & Gawron-
ski, 2013), memory (Jacoby, 1991), and deci-
sion making (Damian & Sherman, 2013; Fer-
reira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman,
2006). In some cases, differences in the C pa-
rameter appear to be responsible for the out-
comes of interest (i.e., racial bias, memory bias;
Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Damian & Sher-
man, 2013; Govorun & Payne, 2006; Jacoby,
1991; Stewart, von Hippel, & Radvansky, 2009;
Payne, 2001), whereas, in other cases, differ-
ences in the A parameter appear to be the driv-
ing factor (Mendoza, Gollwitzer, & Amodio,
2010; Stewart & Payne, 2008). Thus, the PD
model has been applied successfully to distin-
guish between people who show bias on tasks
because of failures of intentional responding
versus unintentional influences (Payne, 2001;
Govorun & Payne, 2006).
The Present Study
In the present study, we apply a multinomial
processing model (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999)
to IAT data from Fujita and Han (2009) to
examine the contributions of intentional (C) and
unintentional (A) processes to changes in im-
plicit evaluations produced by changes in con-
strual level. Within A, high level construal
might enhance the influence of positive associ-
ations with goal-consistent stimuli (apple–good
A) or facilitate the influence of negative asso-
ciations with temptations (cand–bad A). High-
level construal may promote goal consistent
evaluations by changing either of these A com-
ponents, by changing C, or by changing both.
By employing this modeling technique, we aim
to explicate the processes by which high level
construal facilitates efficient goal pursuit, and
contribute to a better understanding of the pro-
cesses that underlie efficient self-regulation,
more broadly.
Method
Participants
In the original study, across all three experi-
ments, participants were female students from
The Ohio State University. In exchange for par-
ticipation, they were granted partial course
credit. Experiment1 had 44 students, Experi-
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ment 2 had 86 students, and Experiment 3 had
91 students.
Procedure and Materials
Construal level manipulation. In all three
experiments, construal level was manipulated
using mindset priming procedures developed in
previous research (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope,
2004; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi,
2006). Specifically, participants were asked to
engage in an exercise designed to prime the
abstraction versus concretization procedures as-
sociated with high-level versus low-level con-
strual, respectively. In Experiment 1, partici-
pants were induced to engage in high-level
versus low-level construal by being asked to list
superordinate ends (“why”) or subordinate
means (“how”) for the target behavior of “main-
taining good personal relationships.” In Exper-
iments 2 and 3, participants were shown 40
objects (e.g., pasta), and were asked to generate
a superordinate category label (e.g., food) ver-
sus subordinate exemplar (e.g., linguini) for
each. Research indicates that procedurally prim-
ing high-level and low-level construal influ-
ences the construal of subsequent unrelated
events (Freitas et al., 2004; Fujita et al., 2006).
IAT. All participants completed the apples
versus candy bar IAT (Karpinski & Hilton,
2001). Participants in the sample, on average,
were concerned about weight loss, making the
evaluation of healthy versus tempting food a
motivationally relevant self-control domain.
Using standard IAT protocol, participants com-
pleted practice trials categorizing apples (e.g.,
Fuji) and candy bars (e.g., Snickers) as well as
valenced words (e.g., sickness; gift) as unpleas-
ant or pleasant. After the practice trials, level of
construal was manipulated. Following the con-
strual level manipulation, participants per-
formed the critical blocks pairing apples and
candy bars with pleasantness or unpleasantness
in counterbalanced order. To examine the rela-
tive preference for apples versus candy bars, the
IAT d score was calculated. Because they were
easier for the participants to complete (e.g.,
participants made fewer errors and were quicker
to respond), candy bar  bad/apples  good
trials were considered compatible. Because they
were more difficult to complete (e.g., partici-
pants made more errors and were slower to
respond), candy bar  good/apple  bad trials
were considered incompatible. As such, d
scores were coded so that higher numbers indi-
cated greater ease in associating candy bar 
bad/apples  good.
Results
The original study from Fujita and Han
(2009) found that increasing construal level
promotes more positive evaluations of apples
relative to candy bars on the IAT. However, it
is unclear how changing construal level influ-
ences evaluations at the process level. To ad-
dress this question, we employed a variant of
the process-dissociation model, process dissoci-
ation plus guessing (PD  G).1 PD  G esti-
mates C, A, and a guessing parameter (G). The
addition of a guessing parameter allows one to
account for responses that are not due to C or A.
For example, in the absence of detection and
selection of the correct response and when no
evaluative associations are activated, partici-
pants may still have a bias to choose “pleasant”
or “unpleasant” responses. When models do not
account for the influence of guessing, all errors
made in the bias-consistent direction (e.g., mis-
takenly categorizing an apple as good on an
apple bad trial) are attributed to unintentional
processes, potentially inflating the A estimate
(Burke, 2015). When the guessing parameter is
added to the process dissociation model, the A
parameter more precisely represents the extent
to which unintentional processes drive re-
sponses.
The structure of this processing tree is dem-
onstrated in Figure 1. In the processing tree,
each path represents a likelihood of a given
process driving a response on a trial. Parameters
with lines leading to them are conditional on
preceding parameters (e.g., guessing is condi-
tional, depending on A and C). These condi-
tional relationships create a system of equations
that can be used to predict correct and incorrect
responses based on trial type (i.e., compatible
and incompatible trials). For example, on an
apple compatible trial, the probability of a cor-
1 In addition to conceptual reasons, such as the possible
inflation of A estimates in using a model without a guessing
parameter (Burke, 2015), we chose the PD  G model over
PD and the Quad model (Sherman et al., 2008) based on
comparisons of model fit (Wu, Myung, & Batchelder,
2010). Model fits are reported in Table 1.
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rect response can be obtained with the proba-
bility: C  (1-C)A  (1-C)(1-A)(1-G). This
equation represents the possible ways by which
a participant can make a correct response on a
given trial. The first part of the equation, C,
represents the probability that the correct an-
swer is intentionally detected and implemented
by the participant. On a compatible trial, a par-
ticipant may fail to detect the correct answer but
may still make the correct response due to the
unintentional influence of activated associations
between apple and pleasant, represented by
(1-C)A. In the absence of detecting the correct
answer or using activated associations between
apple and pleasant, a participant may still give the
correct answer by guessing pleasant (1-C)
(1-A)(1-G). The equations for each item type
(candy, apples, pleasant words, and unpleas-
ant words in both the compatible and incom-
patible blocks) are then used to predict the
errors observed in the data. Using a maximum
likelihood procedure, parameter values are
estimated until reaching the smallest possible
chi square value. The obtained chi square
value represents the difference between the
observed and predicted pattern of errors (Co-
hen, 1988). The parameter estimates them-
selves represent the extent to which each pro-
cess contributes to the pattern of errors and
correct answers observed in the IAT data.
To investigate the processes underlying the
effect of construal level on performance on the
apples versus candy IAT, we obtained parame-
ter estimates for both the low-level and high-
level construal conditions for all studies. The
model fit well across all studies, suggesting that
the PD  G model was appropriate to explain
the data. In Experiment 1, the chi-square for
model fit was 2  .05, p  .973. Experiments
2 and 3 had identical procedures and results
and, as such, were combined to maximize the
power of the model estimates, 2  3.51, p 
.172.
In both Experiment 1 and combined Experi-
ments 2 and 3 there were significant differences
between the high and low-level conditions on
the C parameter. Specifically, participants en-
gaged in high-level construal had greater C es-
timates relative to participants engaged in low-
level construal, Experiment 1 2  3.43, p 
.064; Experiment 2 & 3 2  6.57, p  .010
(see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). In addi-
tion, in combined Experiments 2 and 3, the
high-level construal had a higher A estimate
(M  .09, SE  .03) than the low-level con-
strual condition (M  .00, SE  .03), 2 
7.08, p  .008. However, the A estimates in
Experiment 1 did not differ based on construal
level, 2  .14, p  .708.
Although construal level appeared to change
the involvement of unintentional processes, the
basic PD  G model cannot test which acti-
vated associations were driving responses. That
is, an increase in A processes on this task can
stem from the unintentional influence of asso-
ciations between apples and pleasantness (ap-
ple–good A) or between candy bars and un-
pleasantness (cand–bad A). In order to examine
these different possibilities in Experiments 2
and 3, we employed a PD  G model with two
separate A parameters, one representing the in-
fluence of apple/good associations (apple–good
Figure 1. Multinomial processing tree for process dissociation plus guessing.
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A) and another representing the influence of
candy bars/bad associations (cand– bad A).2
The cand–bad A estimate did not differ across
groups, 2  1.80, p  .180. However, the
apple–good A estimate was greater (M  .12,
SE  .12) in the high-level construal condition
than in the low-level construal condition (M 
.00, SE .13), 2 4.46, p .035 (see Table
2 for descriptive statistics). These findings indi-
cate that high level construal increases the un-
intended influence of positive goal-relevant as-
sociations.
General Discussion
Altering evaluations of goal-relevant stim-
uli in a goal-congruent direction facilitates
goal-congruent behavior (Fujita, 2008; Fujita
& Carnevale, 2012). Prior research has found
that construal level can influence how people
evaluate goal-relevant stimuli, even when
they have limited time and resources to de-
liberate about their evaluations (Carnevale,
Fujita, Han, & Amit, 2015; Fujita & Han,
2009). To date, however, there has been little
investigation into the processes by which con-
strual influences evaluation. The current re-
search used a multinomial model to investi-
gate the role of key processes involved in
implicit evaluation. Our analyses suggest that
construal level influences implicit evaluation
by increasing the unintended influence of pos-
itive goal-consistent associations (apple 
good), as well as by enhancing the ability to
intentionally detect and accurately respond to
goal-relevant stimuli.
Our results are consistent with the findings
of past work on motivation and racial bias.
Specifically, individuals with strongly held
goals to avoid being prejudiced (high IMS/
low EMS; Devine et al., 2002) tend to show
lower bias on the race IAT. Such lowered bias
is associated with lower Black– bad and
White– good associations, in addition to in-
creased detection of correct responses (Gon-
salkorale et al., 2011). The fact that changes
in detection and association-related processes
were observed in both Gonsalkorale et al.
(2011) and in the current work may suggest
something general about the processes under-
lying successful goal pursuit. In particular,
goal consistent evaluation of stimuli in con-
texts allowing minimal deliberation (e.g.,
goal-consistent evaluations on the IAT) may
stem from both changes in the impact of un-
intentional processes and the ability to inten-
tionally detect and accurately respond to goal-
relevant stimuli. These findings are also
consistent with the suggestion that high-level
construal promotes control by enhancing the
identification and implementation of thoughts
and behaviors that are goal-consistent. This
form of control does not appear to require a
great deal of mental resources or deliberation
2 A PD  G model with 2 A parameters is initially a
model that has 0 degrees of freedom. Without a degree of
freedom, one cannot compare parameter estimates across
construal-level groups. To gain one degree of freedom, we
set the G parameter to be equal across groups. It was
appropriate to set the G parameters equal, given that across
all studies, the construal groups did not differ in their G
estimate.
Table 1
Fit Statistics by Experiment
Experiment and model 2 MDL AIC BIC
Experiment 1
Quad model 20.94 1,251.85 2,472.12 2,538.99
PD  G 0.05 1,246.25 2,466.86 2,506.98
PD 9.06 1,246.05 2,471.86 2,498.61
Experiment 2 and 3
Quad model 129.81 6,824.67 13,614.59 16,171.82
PD  G 3.51 6,824.20 13,613.44 13,662.89
PD 9.78 6,821.08 13,615.70 13,648.67
Note. Lower numbers indicate better fit to data. MDL  minimum description length;
AIC  Akaike information criterion; BIC  Bayes information criterion; PD  process
dissociation; PD  G  process dissociation plus guessing.
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(Amodio et al., 2008; Bartholow, Dickter, &
Sestir, 2006; Correll, Urland, & Ito, 2006).
It is unclear why the results of Experiment 1
differ from the results of Experiment 2 and 3.
One possible reason is that the construal level
manipulation used in Experiment 1 differed
from the later experiments. Experiment 1 also
had the smallest sample size of all 3 experi-
ments. To address this, we ran an additional
analysis combining all studies to maximize
power to detect effects. The model fit well, 2
3.17, p  .205, suggesting that the model was
appropriate to explain the data. Mirroring the
results of combined Experiments 2 and 3, the C
estimate was higher in the high-level construal
condition (M  .88, SE  .01) than the low-
level condition (M  .86, SE  .01), 2 
9.06, p  .003. In addition, there was a higher
A estimate for the high-level condition, (M 
.09, SE  .03) relative to the low-level condi-
tion (M  .00, SE  .03), 2  6.72, p 
.010, which was again driven by a higher apple–
good A estimate (high-level M .12, SE .12,
low-level M .00, SE .03), 2  5.23, p
.022. These findings suggest that, overall, high-
level construal facilitated implicit goal pursuit
by increasing both C and A.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although we found that high-level con-
strual increased the influence of apple– good
associations, this particular IAT elicits rela-
tively low bias. Low estimates of A may be a
limitation of the apples versus candy bar IAT.
In particular, IAT scores (proapple/anticandy
bar bias) on the apples versus candy bar IAT
tend to be lower than other IATs, such as the
race IAT (prowhite/antiblack bias). In fact, in
the original implementation of the apples ver-
sus candy bar IAT, as well as in Fujita and
Han (2009), participants had relatively more
positive evaluations of apples than of candy
bars (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Thus, the
current data measure the extent of goal-
consistent evaluations on a task that already
favors goal-consistent evaluations. It is pos-
sible that the processes by which construal
level impacts evaluations could differ in do-
mains in which compatible trials are incon-
sistent with global goals. To address this
question, further work should use comparison
categories that more strongly activate associ-
ations that conflict with participants’ goals
(Carnevale et al., 2015). Such a follow-up
Table 2
Parameter Estimates by Experiment
Parameter High level Low level
Experiment 1
C .90 (.01) [.89, .92] .88 (.01) [.87, .90]
A .04 (.08) [.12, .20] .00 (.07) [.14, .14]
Apple–good A .13 (.35) [.56, .81] .00 (.38) [.75, .75]
Candy–bad A .00 (.29) [.57, .81] .02 (.29) [.55, .59]
G .39 (.04) [.31, .47] .44 (.04) [.37, .51]
Experiment 2 and 3
C .88 (.01) [.87, .88] .86 (.01) [.85, .87]
A .09 (.03) [.03, .16] .00 (.03) [.06, .06]
Apple–good A .12 (.12) [.12, .36] .00 (.13) [.26, .26]
Candy–bad A .07 (.12) [.15, .30] .00 (.13) [.26, .26]
G .46 (.02) [.43, .50] .47 (.02) [.44, .51]
All experiments combined
C .88 (.01) [.87, .89] .86 (.01) [.86, .87]
A .09 (.03) [.03, .14] .00 (.03) [.06, .06]
Apple–good A .12 (.12) [.12, .36] .00 (.03) [.06, .06]
Candy–bad A .06 (.11) [.17, .28] .00 (.12) [.23, .23]
G .45 (.02) [.42, .48] .47 (.01) [.44, .50]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses, and 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
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could also expand our understanding of
whether construal level only increases the
influence of goal-consistent associations or
whether it can also decrease the influence of
goal-inconsistent ones.
Another possible limitation concerns whether
the effect of construal level on implicit evalua-
tions truly reflects goal-relevant responses.
Given that female undergraduates on average
tend to report being concerned with weight-loss,
we believe that it is reasonable to assume that
apples versus candy bars represents a motiva-
tionally relevant self-control dilemma. Never-
theless, in keeping with other research examin-
ing the effect of construal level on self-control
(Carnevale et al., 2015; Fujita & Sasota, 2011;
Fujita et al., 2006), demonstrating that these
effects are specific to those for whom the self-
control domain is motivationally relevant (vs.
not relevant) is an important future direction.
Implications
One extension to our understanding of the
effects of construal level on self-control is our
apple–good A finding. In particular, high-level
construal increased the influence of apple–good
associations. Although research on construal
level and self-control has frequently found that
construal level impacts preferences (Fujita &
Han, 2009), it has, at times, been unclear in
which direction preferences were being moved.
Specifically, it has been difficult to determine
whether high-level construal decreases prefer-
ence for local stimuli or increases preference for
stimuli that facilitate global goals. In the current
study, high-level construal promoted the influ-
ence of positive goal-consistent associations.
High-level construal also promoted success-
ful goal pursuit by enhancing the ability to
detect and accurately respond to goal-relevant
stimuli. Thus, these findings support the asser-
tion that construal level may promote self-
control via intentional mechanisms that, never-
theless, do not require the slow and resource-
demanding processes that most dual-process
and dual-systems models of self-control posit.
Our findings build on a growing body of evi-
dence that goal-relevant intentional processes
can be accomplished very efficiently, even
when responding on implicit measures (e.g.,
Fishbach et al., 2010; Fishbach & Shah, 2006;
Moskowitz & Li, 2011; Moskowitz, Salomon,
& Taylor, 2000; Payne, 2001; Sherman et al.,
2008).
Overall, our modeling results contribute to a
better understanding of how construal level op-
erates on mental processes, which may offer
insight into when increasing construal level
might be most effective for facilitating self-
control (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). Our
C parameter results suggest that increasing con-
strual level may be particularly effective when
participants have a difficult time accurately
identifying goal-relevant stimuli and respond-
ing to them appropriately (Fishbach & Con-
verse, 2010; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). Any
intervention that targets construal level, for ex-
ample, may be especially effective when people
are first adopting new goals and are less adept at
identifying and evaluating goal-relevant stimuli
and behavior. At the same time, the changes in
influence of associations suggest that increasing
construal level may be especially helpful for
increasing the perceived positivity of goal-
consistent stimuli in the first place (Fujita &
Roberts, 2010). This also suggests that high-
levels of construal may be most helpful for
promoting the approach of goal consistent stim-
uli, rather than avoiding stimuli that are disrup-
tive to global goal pursuit.
Conclusion
Although some research on self-control finds
that goal pursuit is challenging and reliant on
limited resources (Baumeister, Bratslavsky,
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, &
Tice, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2009), other find-
ings allow for more optimism. There is evi-
dence for goals impacting the evaluation of
tempting stimuli even when deliberation is lim-
ited (Carnevale et al., 2015; Fishbach et al.,
2010; Fujita & Han, 2009). Such evaluations
have been linked to meaningful self-control be-
havior, suggesting that less positive evaluations
of tempting stimuli may predict better self-
control. The current research furthers our un-
derstanding of how construal levels change the
evaluation of tempting stimuli by investigating
the underlying processes. Our findings suggest
that high level construal increases the influence
of positive goal-relevant associations and facil-
itates accurate detection and responding to goal-
relevant stimuli. Both of these processes have
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been linked to behavior that promotes global-
goal pursuit.
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Correction to Petit et al. (2017)
In the article, “Self-Determination Theory and Intimate Partner Violence: An
APIM Model of Need Fulfillment and IPV,” by Whitney E. Petit, C. Raymond
Knee, Benjamin W. Hadden, and Lindsey M. Rodriguez (Motivation Science,
2017, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 119–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mot0000054), the
third author, Benjamin W. Hadden, was originally omitted from the publication.
The online version of this article has been corrected.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/mot0000103
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